decentralization efforts remain dependent on formal government structures and formalized policy. International development efforts have focused on administrative reform heavily dependent on a well-functioning central government willing and able to develop local autonomy. Thus, strategies have centered on managerial initiatives and technical implementation of a division of responsibilities between national and subnational governments, with little regard to particular political circumstances of particular countries (Cheema and Rondinelli 1983; Mawhood 1983) . Even more recent literature that focuses on local governance and that advocates public participation laments the lack of capacity in central and local governments to bring it about (Hyden and Bratton 1992; Leftwich 1994; World Bank 1990; Wunsch and Olowu 1990) . Often there are scant ties between community-based associations and local government as well as a reluctance to cooperate (Mabogunje 1992 (Mabogunje , 1995 Stren, Motabar, and Attahi 1993; Attahi 1996) . As reluctant as governments may be, there is evidence that increased associational activity has forced authorities to interact with local people and become more accountable (Tripp 1997) . Despite this opportunity for establishing sustainable relationships of accountability, marginalization of public participation by governments and in international development policy remains a serious problem (Ake 1996) . Nowhere is there clearer evidence of this missed opportunity than in the delivery of primary education.
The absence of funding for primary education during the 1980s and 1990s, either from donors or national governments, has spawned alternatives on the ground. Governments in SubSaharan Africa have always found it difficult to provide a viable education system, but under restructuring, they cannot even pretend that they can do it alone (Lee 1988; Bigala and Moorad 1998; Mutangadura and Lamb 2003) . Thus, cost sharing, promoted by the World Bank as part of adjustment since the 1980s, has become a popular policy (Van Adams and Harnett 1996) . Although the original idea of cost sharing was that user fees would fall on social services consumed by the nonpoor, including tertiary and secondary education and some tertiary health services, the idea has spawned, across most of Sub-Saharan Africa, a policy of charging user fees for primary education. In fact, most African governments provide more assistance at the secondary and tertiary levels of education than at the primary level. In most countries, primary education has been decentralized to a subnational level of government, but central government grants for primary education are notoriously diverted to other accounts by these governments; this is not always a question of corruption but one of priorities in cash-strapped administrations. While primary school fees under cost sharing are often nominal by Western standards, they are of some consequence to the majority of parents who are poor, especially for those with larger families. The onus on parents becomes even greater as PTAs add their own, more burdensome fees to fill the gap left by government. However burdensome these fees may be, parent participation may have spawned an important de facto decentralization. As is evident in this study, when the public school system and governments must rely on parents' resources, there emerges the possibility of establishing some political relationships of accountability through public participation.
The need to understand this de facto decentralization in the delivery of primary education becomes urgent with the increased interest in primary education by the international community through UNESCO's project of Education for All (EFA). Beginning with the first meeting in Jontien, Thailand, in 1990 and culminating in the Dakar Framework for Action adopted by the World Education Forum in Dakar, Senegal, in 2000, EFA has established 2015 as the new target for UPE in all developing countries. While such a declaration might give considerable pause to anyone who knows the situation on the ground in most sub-Saharan countries, it has spawned a call for massive donor assistance. Estimates forecast that it will take U.S.$2.5 billion to U.S.$4.2 billion based on an analysis of forty-seven countries with another U.S.$1.4 billion to meet the costs of HIV/AIDS (UNESCO 2002, 17) . Despite these targets, both bilateral and multilateral funding for basic education declined during the 1990s, and it is estimated that the U.S.$1.45 billion external funding to basic education in 2000 is only a quarter of the assistance needed annually until 2015 (Bennell 2002; UNESCO 2002, 18 ). Nevertheless, considerable resources have been targeted for basic education in line with the Dakar goals.
The Dakar Forum has emphasized a decentralized and participatory political process, but several factors hamper the ability of major players to understand what is going on at the local level. It is acknowledged by UNESCO (2002) that there is little data available on enrollment numbers, limited comparative analysis on education policies, and very weak reporting of domestic financing of education. The ability to monitor the quality of education is even more limited. Much research on the delivery of education in the developing world remains focused on the interaction between governments, as mentioned above, albeit with some reference to bringing in public participation (Gershberg 1999; Parry 1997) . The serious lack of knowledge through detailed research on the ground in SubSaharan Africa shows up especially in economic analyses of the efficiency of various proposed policies. Such analyses are based on tests that measure demand for primary education or the efficiency of creating teacher incentives or making funds available for textbooks by doubling class size (Lee 1988; Kremer 2000) . Taken out of context, these analyses assume a normal operating system and so are of little practical value (Kochar 2000) . Behind the smoke and mirrors of their findings lurks a context in which government has little capacity for accountable delivery, where teachers are paid next to nothing, and sporadically at that, classrooms are at a premium, and class sizes are often well above forty students. It also does not address the importance of stable funding in providing adequate service and, concomitantly, better attendance (Mutangadura and Lamb 2003) . More important, such literature does not even acknowledge the already active participation by parents in providing stable funding. Instead, parents are portrayed as having to be manipulated, by public policy, into sending their children to school. The inability to tap into participatory processes is further hampered by the weak research and planning capacity in the education sector of many developing countries as well as by the tendency for the World Bank and bilateral donors to take a concerted approach and exert their own strong influence on the policies of recipient governments (Bennell and Furlong 1998) . As Paul Bennell and Dominic Furlong (1998) point out, giving effective donor support for primary education necessarily involves engaging local processes and funding recurrent expenditure, endeavors that do not lend themselves easily to large universal projects such as the one introduced in Uganda.
᭤ The Experience of UPE in Uganda
Preliminary evidence shows that the introduction of UPE in Uganda served a number of political purposes, nationally and internationally. UPE was important politically for Moweri Museveni's first bid for election as president for a couple of reasons. Although local and national elections have been held regularly since the 1986 victory of Museveni's National Resistance Movement (NRM), the position of president had not been put to an election until 1996. In addition, Museveni was eager to bring in major donor support at a time when donors were threatening withdrawal because of increased military spending in the conflicts with Sudan and in the Democratic Republic of Congo. It also showed the Ugandan government's determination to make primary education a priority, something that most governments fail to do. Therefore, it dovetailed nicely with the renewed donor preoccupation with basic education described above. Under the program, the Ugandan government pledged to provide free primary education to four children in every family, and since 1996, donors have earmarked millions of dollars for building schools and training teachers.
However, instead of improving primary education, the institution of UPE immediately put the delivery of primary education in jeopardy. The national government, in its quest to show its effectiveness and deliver the election promise early, employed a take-charge, top-down approach. Public participation was the first to go as all PTAs were immediately banned. 2 A crisis in accountability quickly followed. Following their own priorities, district administrations were reported to be diverting funds for UPE to other budgets without any consultation.
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On the other hand, school heads were alleged to be registering "ghost" pupils and absconding with the money. In Jinja, the most successful female school head, who had only recently been praised for the improvements to her school, was threatened with arrest for allowing PTA fees to be collected. As a result, PTAs were forced to adopt informal ways of collecting money that easily lead to rent-seeking behavior (Muwanga 2000, 198-201) . Nevertheless, UPE legitimized the state's claim to be the provider of primary education, and with donor pledges behind them, authorities announced that teachers' salaries would be raised from (Uganda shillings) USH43,000/= to USH72,000/= per month.
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As the Jinja study, presented below, shows, government capacity was not adequate for the existing system let alone the increase in students brought about by UPE.
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Yet local councilors, asserting that the central government was now going to pay teachers regularly as well as fund the schools, rejected PTAs, resurrecting the old negative attitude toward participation and the habit of marginalizing public input. 7 It quickly became clear how ill conceived the project was. One researcher on the ground at the time commented that there seemed to be a shortage of everything except pupils (Muwanga 2000) , while an editorial lamented, "Because of government's management approach we are facing a scenario whereby the young beneficiaries of free education will be entrusted to quack teachers-under trees." 8 After pleas by head teachers, the ban on PTAs was lifted for urban areas and a fees cap of USH10,400/=, which one editorial described as a "joke," was announced.
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The head teachers had asked for USH35,000/= PTA fees, given the rise in pupil numbers. Meanwhile, the school year was delayed a month to February 1997, and no money was dispersed until March.
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In Jinja District, paralysis set in as "instead of receiving its regular Shs 67m per month, the government sent only Shs 31m leaving the DEO's office baffled about how to divide the small amount among more than 80 primary schools in the district." Teachers' salaries were delayed for months, reportedly prompting the Minister of Education to make the following pronouncement at the end of the 1997 school year: "I want to thank all teachers who have taught for all these months without pay, you will not only go to heaven but even in this world you'll get abundant blessings."
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As of 2003, donors are reportedly funding 50 percent of the projected cost of UPE with little hope that the Ugandan government will be able to come up with its share, and accountability problems continue.
14 In addition, it is reported that there is a serious problem of teachers simply abandoning the profession out of frustration.
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Despite the infusion of donor funds, the government had not the capacity to meet even the rudimentary costs of the program, let alone provide accountability. Worse yet, the institution of a donor-led UPE program exacerbated the poor conditions that it was, presumably, trying to reverse: lack of accountability, lack of public participation, and lack of improvement in facilities and quality of education.
What is so disappointing about UPE in the Ugandan case is that the policy flew in the face of participatory practices that were forged in a decade of democratic decentralization through new local government institutions. Local government, established in 1987, is composed of several tiers of local councils that, in 1995, were called Resistance Councils (RCs) but were renamed Local Councils (LCs) in 1996.
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The RC1, now LC1, consists of "all persons of or above the age of eighteen years, residing in a village" who elect a nine-member RC1 committee.
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Jinja is divided into fifty-five villages, ten parishes, and three subcounties. The RC1 committees of a parish come together to elect a parish committee (RC2), and the parish committees in turn come together to elect a subcounty committee (RC3). The RC3 committees (twenty-seven councilors) make up Jinja Municipal Council (JMC) and elect an executive committee, including the mayor, to make a municipal council of thirty-six. 18 Thus, in 1995, all councilors were directly elected at the RC1 level, but elections were indirect in the remaining tiers. Although a few councilors could be termed "elite," in 1995, most were of fairly modest means, varying in economic circumstances (usually between formal and informal business or employment) but most having at least secondary education.
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Although the municipality is represented at the district level, Jinja, along with other urban municipalities, is autonomous except for the administering of national government grants for education and health.
What is important is that representation penetrates deeply into the population, with 495 potentially active councilors at the lowest level, and it is inclusive since the mandatory position of secretary for women in each council means at least fifty-five women must be elected at the RC1 level. In 1995, there were approximately seventy women working at all levels of the local government system, and four women were on JMC, including one on the executive committee. In Uganda, political parties exist but are not allowed to support candidates for elections. While this has been seen by some as detrimental to democracy, many people interviewed in Jinja, even those who were critical of the current council, were of the opinion that political parties had made local politics divisive and exclusive while the new system was much more inclusive.
It is the lower councils, as intermediary institutions, that provide for the greatest participation since they are an intricate part of the decision making on JMC.
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The RC1 functions as a popular court where local disputes are heard and decided by a committee of elected peers that must include women. JMC is also dependent on lower councils for cooperation in the administration of the municipality. Issues are discussed there and then raised at higher levels. Although the decision-making process may be more top-down than bottom-up, there is adequate provision for debate in the lower councils. JMC councilors and administrators attend lower council meetings to answer criticisms and often modify policies as a result. It is at this level and the parish level that citizens may also bring their questions and complaints about the local primary schools and instruct their councilors to get answers from the municipal council. This public input may give greater incentive for the municipal council to find ways to alleviate problems.
Moreover, the national government has encouraged and supported local people to come up with their own creative solutions. The Decentralization Secretariat of the Ministry of Local Government has emphasized training in building consensus, emphasizing democratic discussion as well as local autonomy. Local governments are encouraged to create their own solutions, including engaging with civil society associations to bring about local development. By 1995, all districts had authority over their own budgets, with the central government sharing in grants for education and health care, and further decentralization to counties was in progress. The latest phase is now focusing on directing aid agencies and development NGOs to work directly with local governments (Dauda 1999) . In this way, the central government has fostered autonomy and encouraged innovative practices at the local level, but the politics of UPE marginalized this practice.
᭤ The History of PTAs in Uganda
The provision of primary education has long been a controversial political tool in Uganda (Muwanga 2000; Nabuguzi 1995; Passi 1995) . Under colonial rule, primary schools were run by missions while higher levels of education were the responsibility of the central government. In 1942, the colonial government gave local governments responsibility for primary schools along with some grant money, but this only slightly reduced the missions' influence. Mission schools, in particular Anglican and Roman Catholic, catered to the elite, and religion became the basis upon which political parties were aligned and contested power after independence. Thus, when Milton Obote's Ugandan People's Congress (UPC) government nationalized primary education in 1963, the move was seen by Catholics as an attempt by a Protestant government to undermine their political power. When the government took over school management (the missions retained ownership), the missions significantly reduced financial support. The schools relied on government funding, augmented by increased parental support to fill the gap. While the Obote regime did not expand primary education significantly, the exercise did expand opportunities for government patronage and support (Nabuguzi 1995, 196) . Although state support for primary schools did not collapse immediately when Idi Amin took power in 1971, Amin's policies gradually brought about the economic collapse that would see funds dry up in the late 1970s. In fact, public primary schools multiplied during the 1970s, especially in urban areas as more people migrated and demanded education for their children. By 1980, the collapse of government services sparked unprecedented parental participation through PTAs, which strengthened throughout the 1980s when political uncertainty and structural adjustment further eroded government services. PTA activities continued as the NRM government encouraged national recovery throughout the 1990s.
It is this evolving local government system that makes the study of PTAs so interesting in Uganda, and slowly research is emerging. Both Emmanuel Nabuguzi (1995) and Fabius Passi (1995) confirm the heightened participation in general terms but give no detailed studies. Nansozi Muwanga's (2000) study gives a detailed account of parental participation and relationships with teachers and school administrators within government-aided primary schools in Kampala, Mpigi, and Luwero and how they are affected by national government policy, especially the institution of UPE in the late 1990s. Although there has been an increase in private schools in Uganda, even in the rural areas, the more significant phenomenon that is highlighted in these studies is that government-run schools are predominantly funded by PTAs, creating what Passi calls "a public primary school system which is largely under private management" (p. 216).
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All of these studies highlight the problem of inequality that arises when parents become heavily involved in funding schools, but they also recognize the benefits of participation in demanding accountability. Both Passi and Nabuguzi argue for strong state action to bring equity to the system, but Nabuguzi argues that it is the articulation between the state and voluntary organizations, like PTAs, in defining a new working environment that will lead to positive change. Muwanga points out that participation has been marginalized under UPE and argues that government bodies must develop a constructive relationship with participatory associations. The case I present here gives further attention to these issues by presenting an actual example of this articulation between local government, school management, and PTAs in practice. There is a good reason why the Ugandan government has partially restored the participation of PTAs under UPE. As we see in the Jinja case, participation by PTAs is indispensable in providing the funding for primary education. However, the local government system has provided a more inclusive political environment in which a productive partnership has begun to emerge. As a result, relationships of accountability are being forged, and under this joint effort, the primary school delivery has improved in quantity, quality, and equity.
᭤ Method
The material presented in this article is part of doctoral research on local government conducted in the first eight months of 1995. Information was gathered through attendance at meetings on every level of the local government system, through interviews with councilors, members of national governments, local administrators, officials at the national level, and members of community associations and through access to government documents and minutes of meetings. Specific information on the provision of primary education in Jinja involved a case study of seven of the fourteen primary schools. The sample included schools of varying circumstances and geographical locations. Data for the study were taken from minutes of the Education Committee, JMC, 1984 to 1995 and interviews with school heads, PTA executives, councilors involved in management committees, and/or the Education Committee of JMC as well as the director of education and the inspector of schools. Interviews were open-ended but targeted the functioning character of the interaction between these actors. These data are augmented by follow-up interviews with councilors and researchers in the late 1990s as well as research and newspaper reports up to 2003.
᭤ Primary Education in Jinja
The largest urban center outside of the capital, Kampala, Jinja has a population of 65,169. 22 Large-scale industries include the current rehabilitation of the Owen Falls Dam, a brewery, British American Tobacco, a textile factory, grain milling, and a steel mill that is being regenerated in Masese. Medium-sized businesses include fisheries, a leather and tanning factory, and a sawmill. The town center has an informal atmosphere, with one-or two-story buildings in varying degrees of deterioration and multistoried buildings emerging here and there. Fronting multiroomed dwellings are small services, retailers, wholesalers, and craft manufacturers that hover on one side or the other of the formal/informal divide. The most formal section of town is Main Street which leads south to the patch of larger businesses, government buildingsthe municipal council among them-and several banks. To the west and south are low-density residential areas adjacent to Lake Victoria. To the east of the central town and its suburbs is an industrial area and the adjacent Walukuba housing estates for low-income workers. Further east is Masese, where there is a second industrial area and a large fish market on the shore of Lake Victoria. To the northwest of the central town is another high-density area, Mpumudde, where a second housing estate is located. In fact, there is a blurring of high-and low-density areas in Jinja since the bulk of the population is densely concentrated in the central town and adjacent residential areas, the legacy of the renting out of departed Asian property by the Departed Asians Property Custodian Board (DAPCB) to multiple renters. Most schools are located in the most populated areas of the town center with the remaining schools located in Walukuba and Mpumudde, or close to institutions such as police and army headquarters, Uganda Railways Corporation, and Kirinya Prison.
᭤ The History of PTAs and Public Participation in Jinja
The situation of the primary schools in Jinja during the 1980s was indicative of the political chaos of the times. As government money slowed to a trickle in the late 1970s, the population of schoolchildren was growing rapidly. The exodus of the Asian population under Amin's decree especially affected the delivery of primary education in Jinja, which had a large Asian population. The schools were not only dependent on funding from the Asian business community but also were largely staffed with Asian teachers. After the expulsion, JMC was unable or unwilling to take on the responsibility and was clearly not accountable to local people. For example, the council levied parents for several nominal education taxes, but the administration could not account for the money collected. The schools were rapidly deteriorating, and there was little hope of new classrooms being built to meet the growing need.
Despite the hostility of the council, it was at this point that parents began demanding a role and started to organize PTAs at individual schools. Despite their inability to act, councilors repeatedly turned down requests by PTAs for the power to raise fees to keep the schools in repair. Ignoring a council that was clearly negligent, the parents proceeded to collect fees and push ahead with building and maintenance. Municipal councilors demanded that they turn over the money they collected to council officials, but the PTAs maintained their autonomy despite the constant threats by the council to disband them and take over their funds. By 1985, one PTA had built a new school, and others were making plans to add classrooms and dig pit latrines. The PTAs acted in spite of the municipal council, and in fact, the headmasters and PTAs were completely in control as headmasters even kept the government fees they collected, putting them into the PTA budget rather than handing them over to the municipal council.
Although it is clear that the PTAs were instrumental in keeping the schools functioning, their management alone did not provide enough stability to build a viable system. Teachers, already suffering from poor and sporadic wages, were left without housing since most sought accommodation in the town center, where corrupt council officials allowed houses that were to be designated for teachers to be taken over by other tenants. The report on education delivered to the new RCs at the end of 1987 explains how the teachers were affected:
Generally, lack of housing facilities causes lack of concentration and instability of the teaching staff. . . . Because of the meagre salaries most male teachers are forced into hawkering in the market, running stalls etc. While some of their female counter parts are forced into premature marriages, temporary marriages which have caused untold suffering. We have lost lives of some teachers this way.
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While PTAs did keep the schools open for those who could pay, parents who found the school full or were unable to pay had to find alternative, and often destructive, ways of accessing the system. Thus, teachers and school heads were threatened by some, bribed by others. Teachers, working under terrible conditions, were actively encouraging private coaching for children whose parents who could pay. Parents scrambled to send their children to schools where the PTA was active, but these were usually located in the town center where so many African businesses were now renting. Other school sites on the periphery were all but abandoned. Such a system guaranteed inequality between schools and was unable to bring standards to the system as a whole. It was reported of one headmaster who had been under pressure from parents that he simply wrote a chit saying he was leaving the school and stuck it on the school notice board and handed the keys to the police station and went away.
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PTA executives and headmasters were accused of accepting bribes and embezzling PTA fees, and although they had kept some schools open, the PTAs came to be regarded by both the government and the public as the cause of the inequities in the system.
᭤ School Management in the 1990s
In 1987, the newly elected local government under the NRM showed reluctance to endorse the PTAs but also demonstrated its willingness to find innovative ways to tackle intractable problems. Aware of the public disapproval of PTAs, councilors looked for ways to reduce their operations and influence. However, efforts to raise an education tax were abandoned because the suggestion was highly unpopular, and another education levy, raised by Jinja District, yielded only a small amount for the municipality's schools since JMC is seen as resource-rich compared to other parts of the district. By 1988, it was clear that the council could not run the schools alone, and it actively sought, albeit grudgingly, the support of the PTAs. Whatever the misgivings about PTAs, it is clear that the new council had a different and more positive attitude toward partnership with local civil society than the previous regime. The council encouraged the formation of active PTAs in schools where there had been none. School management committees that combined the efforts of councilors, school heads, and parents were set up in every school to establish and prioritize development plans. The councilors formally agreed that the PTAs could keep their budgets separate and encouraged the PTAs to supplement teachers' salaries and to help with the housing crisis (only 80 of 480 teachers received help with housing at the time). By the early 1990s, the council was entering into a fifty-fifty deal with PTAs on capital works. It is this fledgling partnership, examined below, that steered the delivery of primary education in the 1990s.
By 1995, Jinja's schools were making a slow recovery, but the legacy of the past was still very evident. Of the fourteen primary schools in Jinja, two are recently built and the rest are slowly repairing and adding onto the dilapidated remains of buildings dating from the 1960s. Only Victoria Nile Primary School, in the better-off suburb where senior civil servants reside, has been kept in good repair. However, even in that school the lowest grades lack sufficient furniture and fifty students are crowded into one classroom with two teachers. The worst of the schools (Uganda Railways School, east of town by the railway workers' residences and Kirinya, named after the prison on which it borders, as well as the two schools in Walukuba) have only benches and blackboards and few doors or windows that can be shut properly to keep secure the few existing supplies. Some of the schools have electricity and standpipes and most use pit latrines.
25
In these schools, "overcrowding" at the lower levels indicates classes of up to eighty students with two teachers in one classroom. Classes are smaller at the upper level because of a considerable dropout rate. However, since primary education is geared to one goal, the P7 primary leaving exams (PLE), school heads also tend to give preferential treatment to the higher classes, however meager the resources.
Even before UPE, primary schools in Jinja were severely underfunded by government. In 1995, parents paid a nominal government school fee per annum (USH2500/=, approximately U.S.$2.50, for P1-4; and USH4000/=, approximately U.S.$4.00, for P5-7), and the central government, through the Ministry of Local Government, was supposed to match this parent contribution. Ten percent of the combined fee is deflected to JMC for administration purposes. The municipality employs an education officer and a school inspector, both of whom have office support. The government contribution is sent by the ministry to Jinja District administration to be distributed to schools in the entire district. In the 1994-95 estimates, the government match should have been approximately USH41,513,000/= for Jinja's primary schools. However, the government contribution has never been more than a few million shillings in any given year and has declined steadily from USH21,762,602/= in 1991 to 1,000,000/= in 1994. 26 The small amount from the education tax goes into making furniture in the council workshop (USH4,000,000/= in 1994). This means chronic and severe underfunding for the schools. As an example, Walukuba East Primary school had eight hundred pupils in 1995, taking in a total of USH2,255,000/=. If the total 10 percent deflection payment (actually 20 percent of the amount collected or USH451,000/=) is taken off for JMC administrative costs, that leaves USH1,804,000/= (approximately U.S.$1,804) to run the school for a year. Since most of this amount comes from JMC in the form of scholastic materials, there is really no budgeting for this money. For Walukuba East School, the water bill alone was USH1,150,000/= in the 1994 school year.
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The central government's other obligation is to pay the salaries of teachers, which were low at USH43,000 per month and, more problematic, sporadic (in April 1995 the teachers in Jinja had just received their February pay). This grossly inadequate government funding leaves school management with demoralized staffs and no ability to budget. The national and local governments were clearly unable to provide for primary schools in Jinja.
Thus, PTAs remained essential to the running of primary schools and more than supplemented the poor contributions of government. PTA fees, charged per term, are more frequent as well as considerably higher than the nominal government fee. In 1995, the fees varied between USH8,000-13,000/= per student per term in most schools except for Victoria Nile, which charged an average of USH77,000/= per student per term in 1995. 28 Much of the PTA budget goes for teacher welfare (salary and rent supplements, lunch and tea), but it also pays for utilities, supplies, and clerical staff and contributes to capital projects such as new classrooms and houses for teachers. 29 Capital projects in the Victoria Nile School 1995 PTA budget totaled USH46,000,000/= for teachers' houses and classrooms. In contrast, JMC spent altogether only USH13,200,000/= on capital projects for all schools in 1994. 30 This means that in budgetary terms, JMC was very much the junior partner to the PTAs.
The necessity of relying on PTAs means that inequalities between schools can be perpetuated. The condition of each school continues to depend very much on the number of pupils and the ability of the parents to pay PTA fees. For Walukuba East Primary School (800 students), the PTA fees for 1995 resulted in an average of USH25,800/= per pupil per year.
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On the other hand, the PTA budget for Victoria Nile School (1,205 pupils) was USH83,116/= per pupil per year. Schools with stronger PTAs pay the teachers more and house them better. In addition to disparities in the amount of the PTA fees, inequalities arise from the inability of parents to pay. Both Walukuba East and Victoria Nile schools reported that parents had paid the fees for the present term, and another school reported that 90 percent of the fees had been paid. However, two schools reported that only 50 percent of the fees had been paid, one reported just 40 percent of the fees had been paid, and another reported that only 30 percent of the fees had been paid.
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Thus, those schools with better-off parents were able to plan and budget much better, although this was changing as some informal policy making, discussed below, was creating alternatives for parents. The mismatch of power over policy and resources caused tension between the PTA executive and the management committee. The school management committee, which sets school policy and oversees operations, is chosen every three years (upon a new municipal council being elected) and is composed of two municipal councilors (chair and vice-chair), the school head (secretary), two teachers, three members appointed by JMC, and two parent representatives (executive members of the PTA). The gender makeup of management teams varied with schools. Two of the schools had female heads, two of the schools had women councilors as chairs, all of the PTA presidents were men, but all executives had one or two women. The gender component reflects the participation of women at the local level in general in Jinja, where women are active but still in the minority. While this management team weighs in on the side of JMC, it only controls the small amount of official funding (parents' contribution and council grants either through general revenue or the government contribution received). The PTA executive, elected every year at an annual general meeting, is completely separate from the management committee and controls its own, much larger, budget. While the management committee might meet twice a term, the PTA executive is called on regularly for signing checks, providing support for the staff, and encouraging parents to pay. In fact, councilors reported that "management committees are being marginalized by PTAs as far as financial control in schools was [sic] concerned." 33 Thus, councilors attempt to marginalize the PTAs when it comes to policy and planning. PTA executives complain that the councilors make decisions that are unrealistic, given the resources available, but that school heads find it hard to say no to politicians. Consequently, school heads are constantly coming to the PTAs for extra money to carry out policy decisions over which PTAs have little control. Sometimes decisions are made without any consultation, as happened in Walukuba when RC3 councilors were told by the administration that there was some money available for building a new classroom but only if it was spent immediately. The councilors quickly decided that Walukuba East School would get a new classroom, hired a contractor, and informed the rest of the management committee after the fact. The contractor, a local man who had begged the councilor who was chair of the Walukuba East School Management committee for the job, was paid and started, then abandoned, the project. Although the committee demanded to see the contractor, he never appeared and his work had never been monitored. At a management meeting, the councilor, who dominated the proceedings, advised the committee to let the contractor pay the money back in installments because "he was a father to me." She admitted that there had been no supervision or documentation of work done and no document of agreement beyond the original quotation.
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In another of the seven schools studied, a management committee was still not functioning, which calls into question how serious some of the councilors are about their role. In the past three years, five of the seven schools had changed headmasters at least once because of mismanagement, and parents, particularly those in Walukuba, voiced their concerns about this at RC2 meetings. Thus, management committees struggled to provide accountability.
The PTAs have their own difficulties. In the past, PTA executives have been accused of not being accountable to the parents who make up their constituencies. Executives tend to be better off than their constituents, and often fees were raised and budgets approved without reference to ordinary members.
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Councilors have also complained that the funds are not properly accounted for. However, gradually the process has become more regulated, and in 1995, fees and budgets had to be ratified at the annual general meeting. Still, there were complaints that the executive would rush the budget through without proper explanation and would save the vote until the end when many people had left. A large part of the problem is that the majority of parents in most schools are poor, and often are preoccupied with avoiding fees. In the most extreme cases, parents leave their children in a school until their children are expelled for nonpayment, then change schools and repeat the exercise. However, by 1995, some school heads, in consultation with the PTAs, were arranging for payments by installments and used expulsion as a last resort. Nevertheless, many parents still avoid management and PTA executives because of demands for fees and, thus, are not in a good position to demand accountability.
The municipal council has also been hampered in its ability to give good administrative support. In 1995, the education officer was the only female senior administrator, and the inspector of schools was also a woman. Salaries are so low that no one can expect even the education officer to be working full-time. 36 Thus, even though repeatedly asked, the education officer has not produced guidelines for PTA-management relations. Only in 1991 was transportation provided to the school inspector through the purchase of a motor bike. Councilors at all levels have criticized the administration for transferring rather than dismissing school heads who mismanage school funds. In addition, until the early 1990s there was no rationalized system for collecting school fees, and thus, it has been very easy for school heads to misappropriate funds. The administration tends to channel what funding there is into school supplies rather than cash, and school heads and PTA executives complain that the council pays too much for these supplies, which could be better targeted and less costly if included in a school's cash budget. During the early 1990s, the attempt to manufacture desks in the council workshop was unproductive because of "no permanent staff to ensure efficiency." 37 About two hundred desks had been distributed between 1990 and 1994.
While each of these three (council administration, management committees, and PTAs) have severe problems, there are some encouraging signs that the three entities in this partnership are calling each other to account. By 1990, the administration had lists of teachers and their qualifications and, with the help of PTA executives, had started rationalizing the number of teachers for each school. In 1988, schools were still refusing to pay school government fees into the council account and keeping them in the PTA account, but by 1995, the payment of official fees had been rationalized and parents were paying them directly to the council account through the bank and, thus, greatly diminishing the chances of direct embezzlement or even the creation of ghost pupils by school heads. In 1993, eight bursars were hired to cover all of the schools in the municipality. There is also a concerted effort by the administration to pressure school heads to get all fees in according to the number of students registered, and an effort is being made to start keeping on file PTA budgets for each school. Likewise, PTAs have rationalized their own process by using bank slips to collect PTA funds instead of cash. As mentioned above, PTAs are cooperating with school heads in finding alternative ways for parents to pay. The creation of an installment plan by one school head has been adopted by others. Thus, the partnership is yielding some positive policy making, albeit informally.
The administration and the councilors have also looked for creative ways to build new classrooms. At Kirinya Primary School, which is built next to the prison, the prison has donated sand and bricks, the PTA cement, and the council iron sheets to build new classrooms. An entire new school was built in a debt swap with the Uganda Electricity Board. Other new classrooms have been built with the cooperation of a women's building project in Masese, run by the Danish Development Agency (DANIDA), where the council and PTA have split materials fifty-fifty and DANIDA has paid the women to build. Unlike the classroom at Walukuba East Primary School, these have been completed without delays. Other classrooms have been built with a straight fifty-fifty cost split between the council and the PTA. Often the management committee chairs have been instrumental in negotiating the split in costs. In this way, the council has increased its stature, and PTA executives commented that there has been a marked change in cooperation between the municipality and PTAs and things are getting done. Even the poorest schools with the least enrolment (Uganda Railways and Kirinya) have started building new classrooms. All of this is evidence that the tripartite relationship between school heads, the PTAs, and the JMC has created opportunities to develop conventions of political behavior that have yielded more accountability.
Perhaps the best evidence that the partnership is working is the great strides made by school heads in closing the gap between schools and providing a better quality of education. Since 1993, two of the most neglected schools, which previously also had the worst PLE results, St. Gonzaga and Mpumudde, have turned around to become showcases for the municipality. The schools are headed by women, both of whom have tried to put the tripartite system to work, and to great advantage. They have actively brought the PTA and management committees together to coordinate efforts and thus have managed to not only make repairs but build new classrooms, offices, and housing for teachers. They have done this by strictly guiding the process, including choosing the contractors and monitoring their progress. These school heads have joined their PTAs in the effort to get parents involved and were the first to arrange for installment payments for poorer parents. Thus, for the first time, rational planning has been feasible in these schools. They have also started formal savings groups with their staffs and have made sure that the PTA supplement is always on time for the teachers so that they have a steady income. Thus, staff morale is palpably different in these two schools. Moreover, the success can be measured in very concrete terms. Mpumudde Primary School went from the worst PLE results in the municipality in 1991 to tie with Victoria Nile for the best results in 1994. The hard work has been duly rewarded by an appreciative municipal council (some extra money and a party for teachers at Mpumudde when the PLE results came out).
The success of these two schools gives evidence of several benefits from the tripartite relationship, both tangible and intangible. The efforts and successes of these school heads show that there is a system in place that can be activated with good results, despite meager resources. Unlike Victoria Nile, Mpumudde charges only average PTA fees (USH11,000/=) per term and, therefore, the tangible success in PLE results demonstrates that PTA involvement does not necessarily mean inequity. More important, it demonstrates the tremendous effect of reliable and sustainable funding and personal commitment to make it happen. None of the headmasters had made such strides except for Victoria Nile School, which has a much higher budget (and maybe should have been doing much more with it). Councilors readily point out that it is women who have turned these schools around, indicating a new attitude toward women and their contributions that is slowly taking hold in this more inclusive political environment. Certainly, the success of these headmistresses has had an effect on other school heads, who are now aware of what can be done. It has become much harder for school heads to plead poor resources; the old excuses simply do not work anymore. This de facto decentralization has empowered individuals to make a difference, and these individuals, in turn, have been able to boost morale both on their staffs and in the municipality in general. These are the intangibles that can only be brought about through establishing local, sustainable relationships from which other, more tangible, things flow. Although these conventions of behavior are not formalized in statutory regulations, they could be; and formal regulations coming out of those conventions would be much more effective, having a firm base in practice. Such regulation would also protect the participatory process.
᭤ Conclusion
While no one would applaud the lack of government funding for primary schools in Jinja, the forced institutional mix for delivering primary education has had some encouraging results with regard to accountability. The local government has been able to establish a partnership with the PTAs, and the result has been more accountability from all sides-school heads, PTAs, and the municipal council. The circumstances bringing about this collaboration are complex. Political openings at the local level were important in at least two ways: lower councils were starting to demand more accountability, while the municipal council was more amenable to the participation of the PTAs. However, the inability of government to provide enough resources was also an important impetus. In this case, the very fact that there are meager resources has forced local government officials to adopt creative solutions that require the use of shared resources. The government simply cannot provide the service without the energy and resources of the local people and so cannot marginalize local people economically and politically as easily as before. Sharing resources means spreading the responsibility between actors with an increased opportunity to develop new conventions of political behavior to produce better accountability. The result is an improvement in the quality of education. When local government accepts participation and starts taking seriously its role as coordinator, a more sustainable and equitable system that supports both teachers and pupils can evolve. The participation of PTAs has brought more dependable funding and allowed for planning that has led to better conditions for both students and teachers. There has also been a move to bring in more parents by accommodating poorer parents with installment plans. In turn, the local government has been spurred on to use its authority in creative ways that enhance its position in ways that complement rather than diminish the capacity of the PTAs. The incapacities of both PTAs and local government are evident. As has been seen, poor parents are not in a position to demand accountability from PTA executives. In turn, local governments can use their authority to marginalize PTAs. However, what is clear is that they have been able to do together what they could not produce on their own.
While these relationships are fragile and easily disrupted, they are irreplaceable. In Uganda, the relationship between PTAs and local government was easily disrupted with the institution of UPE. Even in a country like Uganda where there are some political openings, marginalization of public participation is still very prevalent. While decentralization is an important component of restructuring, actual existing and accountable decentralization is hard to come by. It is also hard work because it grows out of a participatory struggle. The de facto decentralization of primary education to PTAs has made this struggle possible, and thus, parent participation in the delivery of primary education is an important component in developing a local governing process. In addition, the intangibles of producing quality in education, individual empowerment and morale, develop from the relationships forged in this struggle.
Both the education system and the governments responsible for it will only become and remain effective through these relationships. For these reasons, even if governments become more effective, the need for local participation will not diminish.
It is clear to researchers on the ground that ultimately it will be up to parents to sustain primary school systems since governments are unlikely to have the capacity to maintain them, let alone expand into compulsory education. With the participation of PTAs, a de facto participatory decentralization already exists. However, developing the capacity for accountability depends on how parents interact with government authorities. The renewed activity on the part of donors to establish UPE in Sub-Saharan Africa has the potential to cause a setback in this process since donor-led projects give legitimacy to government claims as providers of service. This, in turn, increases the tendency on the part of governments to marginalize public participation, which further lessens the chance of creating relationships of accountability. Such projects in Ghana have shown a lack of accountability and an inability to improve the already very poor quality of education (Bennell 2002) . Kenya has recently embarked upon UPE as the new government seeks legitimacy and both multilateral and bilateral donors have climbed on board (UNESCO 2003). As in Uganda, Kenyan parents have provided both capital and recurrent expenditure before the implementation of the program, and as in Uganda, parent levies were banned upon the announcement of UPE. Overcrowding of up to eighty children per classroom, a shortage of teachers, and an inability on the part of the Kenyan government to regularly pay them does not seem to have stopped the intake of 1.5 million additional children under the program. Here is where multilateral and bilateral donors and lenders would do well to increase the capacity for qualitative research so that, with that knowledge, more appropriate goals can be established by donors and recipient governments. Donors must find methods to use resources that assist rather than shut down the capacity of both PTAs and governments to create accountability through shared responsibility. The 2015 goal of UPE is a pipedream, but the provision of primary education, as it has been evolving on the ground, may be an important means of forging real political accountability in Sub-Saharan Africa.
᭤ Notes
1. The fact that governments have established more support for higher education has a long history in multilateral and bilateral assistance. World Bank policy, based on now questioned and questionable policy recommendations, has favored the development of tertiary education, especially polytechnical institutions, which also districts, twelve municipalities, and forty-four town councils. Town councils have less autonomy than municipalities. Kampala, the capital city, is designated as a district (RC5 18. Anyone elected to a higher tier is replaced on the lower tier. In the 1995 RC system, the RC3 committees of each district elected the district council (RC5). As of the 1997 local government legislation, the subcounty level (LC3) is directly elected by universal suffrage, as is the LC5, but all others remain the same.
19. A poll of JMC councilors revealed the occupations of thirtythree out of thirty-six. Twelve councilors were owners of businesses that ranged from small to large retail enterprises to small to large manufacturing plants. There was one owner of a taxi business who also had a cattle ranch, one proprietor of a private nursery school, and one owner of a Forex Bureau. Five councilors were managers in large formal companies, and five were professionals (one engineer, one accountant, two teachers, and a headmistress). There was one former chief magistrate (who was the fifth woman on JMC but who left to run for the Constituent Assembly during the research period) and two court clerks. There was one councilor taking a diploma in legal practice, five workers in industry, one trader, and one unemployed person.
20. For a more comprehensive analysis of lower councils, see Dauda (1999, 178-96) .
21. There are no statistics on private schools, although some district education offices keep them. Muwanga (2000) found that 40 percent of schools in Mpigi District and about 30 percent in Luwero were private. Kampala had no statistics. Wealthy parents in Jinja sent children to schools in Kampala. However, most better-off people in Jinja simply sent their children to the best PTA-funded public school (Victoria Nile), demonstrating the blurring between public and private. As with public schools, the quality of the school depends very much on the parent base. In Jinja, there was a private preschool that was no better in quality than the better public schools. One private primary school I observed in the rural area outside of Jinja held class outdoors.
22. 1991 Population and Housing Census (Jinja District), Uganda Statistics Department, Ministry of Finance, Entebbe, Uganda, p. 9. 23. A Brief by the Education Officer, Education Committee, December 16, 1987 , p. 6. 24. Minutes, Education Committee, JMC, April 4, 1995 . The school near Uganda Railways Corporation (URC) houses the younger grades in old railway cars where there is no electricity although there is some furniture. The school depends on standpipes owned by URC, which often does not pay the water bill, and then the school must purchase water by the jerrycan. In 1993, JMC considered closing the school for health reasons because of lack of water (Minutes, Education Committee, JMC, April 1, 1993 . 26. Minutes, Education Committee, JMC, April 29, 1992 and June 2, 1993 1994-94 Estimates, JMC; Quarterly Audit Inspection Report on Jinja Municipal Council Financial Operations, January 31, 1995. The government contribution goes through the Jinja District headquarters in Bugembe, and JMC has always complained that the district does not release its fair portion either through mismanagement or through directing those funds to rural areas that have less revenue than JMC. The government contribution was converted to a block grant of USH19m for the whole district in 1994 (Minutes, Education Committee, JMC, March 13, 1995) . This cannot be completely blamed on the Ministry of Local Government, which matches according to parents' contribution documented. For a number of reasons, the records of parent contributions do not get to the ministry in a timely fashion. Often school heads have just not accounted for the money, and often parents have been slow at paying so payments get behind (Minutes, Education Committee, JMC, December 6, 1993). However, there is still a problem with getting the money through the district, which has other priorities.
27. Walukuba East Primary School PTA Estimated Income and Expenditure 1995.
28. Interviews were conducted with the headmasters and PTA executives of seven of the fourteen schools. Two out of the seven schools interviewed charged higher PTA fees for higher grades. Victoria Nile also had differentiated charges but charged the youngest children the highest fees (USH105,000/= as compared to USH75,000) presumably because they are the most numerous and, thus, bring in the most money (these higher fees did not reflect on the service provided for the youngest grades, which was definitely inferior). These figures had to be gathered through interviews since JMC did not keep the information and there was no regulated amount.
29. The supplements per month for teachers' salaries vary from USH8,000/= at the poorest schools to USH18,000-50,000/= at better-off schools. In most schools, there is a range that reflects qualifications, experience, and grade level.
30. JMC, Preamble to the Budget, 1994-95, p. iv. 31. The actual PTA income and expenditure for 1994 was USH18,545,720/= as reported in the Walukuba East Primary School Estimated Income and Expenditure 1995.
32. The first term starts the first week of January, and the interviews from which these figures are taken were conducted between the first week of March and the first week of April, toward the end of the first term.
33. Minutes, Education Committee, JMC, June 17, 1991, p. 6. 34 . This school had a succession of headmasters over the threeyear period that this contract dispute had been going on. The former headmaster had been removed for mismanagement and sent to Walukuba West Primary School (he had been removed from a school previous to that, and at an RC2 meeting, parents complained that they were given a headmaster who had mismanaged both Main Street Primary and Walukuba East Primary and said they did not want him). The headmaster, who had just been appointed for the 1995 year, starting in January, had been removed from another school where he had run the school into debt (he did not disclose water and electricity bills) and had rarely called a management committee meeting. The council administration had maintained that he should have a last chance.
35. Because people in Jinja have a mixture of informal and formal economic activities, it is not easy to make a class analysis. Executives interviewed were of modest means but had steady income, usually from small businesses. There were no executives of demonstrably better means except at Victoria Nile School, where all parents were better off.
36. In the JMC 1994-95 estimates, the education officer's salary was pegged at USH1,041,500/= (approximately U.S.$1,041).
37. Minutes, Education Committee, JMC, October 26, 1991.
